State of Utah v. Joseph Finano Moya : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
State of Utah v. Joseph Finano Moya : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James A. Valdez; Ronald S. Fujino; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; attorney for appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; attorney general; attorneys for appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Moya, No. 890608 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2258
K**J 
Bz"it.bi* 
• J 
POCKET NO. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOSEPH FINANO MOYA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890608-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1978) ,, 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding. 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC, 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
JOSEPH FINANO MOYA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890608-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (1978), 
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding. 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
RONALD S. FUJINO 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS . . . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. STATE V. GREENE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
APPLICABLE STATUTE TERMINATED APPELLANTS 
PROBATION AFTER EIGHTEEN MONTHS. 8 
POINT II. THE STATE SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED 
APPELLANTS PROBATION PURSUANT TO STATUTE. . . . 12 
POINT III. THE COURT LOST ITS JURISDICTION OVER 
APPELLANT AFTER HIS SENTENCE WAS INDEFINITELY 
SUSPENDED. 17 
POINT IV. THE 1984 TOLLING PROVISION DOES NOT 
APPLY. 18 
A. STATE V. GREEN RENDERS IMPRACTICABLE 
THE 1984 TOLLING PROVISION 19 
B. THE STATE IMPLICITLY AUTHORIZED AND 
KNEW ABOUT APPELLANT'S WHEREABOUTS 
OUTSIDE THE STATE OF UTAH 21 
CONCLUSION 24 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Gaqnon v. Scarpelli. 411 U.S. 778, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, 
93 S.Ct. 1756 (1973) 11 
In re Flint. 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 (1903) 18 
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care. Inc.. 679 P.2d 
903 (Utah 1984) 20 
Morrissev v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 
92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972) 11 
State v. Penney. 776 P.2d 91 (Utah App. 1989) . . . . 11, 12 
State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988) passim 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-12-4 (1982) 14, 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(3) (Interim Supp. 1984) . . 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8) (Interim Supp. 1984) . . 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(b) (Supp. 1989) 10, 20 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984). 8, 16, 19, 
20, 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984). 19, 20, 21, 
23 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984) . . 11, 12, 13, 
14, 15, 16 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-29 (1982) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-22 (1982) 22, 23 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-23(2) (1982) 22 
U. S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 11 
11 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-12-4 (1982) states: 
Bench warrant or summons for defendant not in 
custody. When an indictment is found against a 
defendant not in custody, a bench warrant or summons 
shall be issued against him as determined by the 
court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-29 (1982) states: 
Rights of parolee or probationer—Record of 
proceedings. With respect to any hearing pursuant 
to this act, the parolee or probationer shall have 
the following rights: 
(a) Reasonable notice in writing of the 
nature and content of the allegations to be made, 
including notice that its purpose is to determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe that he 
has committed a violation that may lead to a 
revocation of parole or probation. 
(b) Be permitted to advise with any persons 
whose assistance he reasonably desires, prior to the 
hearing. 
(c) To confront and examine any persons who 
have made allegations against him, unless the 
hearing officer determines that such confrontation 
would present a substantial present or subsequent 
danger of harm to such person or persons. 
(d) May admit, deny or explain the violation 
alleged and may present proof, including affidavits 
and other evidence, in support of his contentions. 
A record of the proceedings shall be made and 
preserved. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-22 (1982) states: 
Fugitives from this state—Issuance of governor's 
warrant. Whenever the governor of this state shall 
demand a person charged with a crime or with 
escaping from confinement or breaking the terms of 
his bail, probation, or parole in this state from 
the executive authority of any other state or from 
the chief justice or an associate justice of the 
superior court of the District of Columbia 
iii 
authorized to receive such demand under the laws of 
the United States, he shall issue a warrant under 
the seal of this state to some agent, commanding him 
to receive the person so charged if delivered to him 
and convey him to the proper officer of the county 
in this state in which the offense was committed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-23 (1982) states in pertinent part: 
Fugitives from this state—Applications for 
requisition for return. 
(2) When the return to this state is 
required of a person who has been convicted of a 
crime in this state and has escaped from confinement 
or broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole 
the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the 
offense was committed, the parole board, or the 
warden of the institution or sheriff of the county 
from which escape was made shall present to the 
governor a written application for a requisition for 
the return of such person, in which application 
shall be stated the name of the person, the crime of 
which he was convicted, the circumstances of his 
escape from confinement, or of the breach of the 
terms of his bail, probation or parole, the state in 
which he is believed to be, including the location 
of the person therein at the time application is 
made. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(3) (Interim Supp. 1984) 
See Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8) (Interim Supp. 1984) 
See Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(b) (Supp. 1989) 
See Addendum A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984) 
See Addendum B. 
iv 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984) 
See Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984) 
See Addendum B. 
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States provides in 
pertinent part: 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
JOSEPH FINANO MOYA, : Case No. 890608-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals 
from a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a 
first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did Appellant Moya's probation terminate, by operation 
of law, eighteen months after he was sentenced? 
2. Did the jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminate 
when the State failed to continue Appellant's probation pursuant to 
statute? 
3. Did the court indefinitely suspend Appellant Moya's 
sentence and consequently lose its jurisdiction? 
4. Does the 1984 tolling provision apply to Mr. Moya's 
situation? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On August 10, 1984, Appellant Joseph Finano Moya entered a 
guilty plea to the charge of Burglary, a third degree felony. See 
Record (hereinafter referred to as "R") at 13-14. The court 
sentenced Appellant Moya on September 13, 1984. See R. 84; 
Transcript of September 13, 1984 Sentencing Proceedings (hereinafter 
referred to as "TA") at 1. 
Shortly thereafter on October 3, 1984, the court released 
Mr. Moya to the State of New Mexico where he faced charges 
unconnected to the Utah burglary charge. (R. 19);(TA. 4). On or 
about April 17, 1985, the State of Utah discovered that the New 
Mexico charges would not be continued. (R. 23). 
On October 21, 1988, the State of Utah filed an "Affidavit 
in Support of Order to Show Cause" which sought to revoke Appellant 
Moya's probation. (R. 41). At Appellant's Order to Show Cause 
hearing on November 10, 1988, the court revoked Mr. Moya's probation 
and reinstated a prison term previously suspended. Transcript of 
Sentencing Proceedings, dated November 10, 1988 (hereinafter 
referred to as "TB") at 8; (R. 44). On February 17, 1989 and 
September 6, 1989, the parties again appeared before the court on a 
Motion for Rehearing. Transcript of Sentencing Proceedings, dated 
February 17, 1989 and September 6, 1989 (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as "TC") at 1. The court upheld its previous ruling. 
(TC. 19-20). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During the September 13, 1984 sentencing proceeding before 
the Honorable Scott Daniels, Appellant's counsel informed the court 
of outstanding warrants and charges filed against Appellant by 
New Mexico authorities. See R. 84; (TA. 4-8). New Mexico sought to 
extradite Appellant for charges unconnected to the Utah burglary 
charge. (TA. 5). 
Recognizing that the New Mexico charges were merely 
allegations and not proven convictions, Judge Daniels refused to 
consider them in sentencing Appellant to an indeterminative term of 
"not more than five years" in the Utah State Prison. (R. 84); 
(TA. 13). The court immediately suspended the sentence "upon 
probation and the following conditions to be imposed[:] That the 
defendant [Mr. Moya] spend six months in the Salt Lake County 
Jail[;] . . . pay full restitution[;] and . . . complete upon his 
release from jail an alcohol rehabilitation program to be set up by 
the Department of Adult Probation & Parole [AP&P]." (TA. 13). The 
court suspended these sentences too, holding that "those conditions 
[are] also to be stayed, assuming [Appellant] is extradited also, 
until he is returned from New Mexico" (TA. 13). 
Following the sentencing proceeding, the court recorded 
Appellant's sentence in a "Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) to Utah 
State Prison" form (R. 17-18). The court, however, omitted any 
reference to the New Mexico extradition proceedings. Compare 
(TA. 13) with (R. 17-18) . 
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On September 17, 1984, the court authorized Mr. Moya's 
extradition to New Mexico (R. 19). On October 3, 1984, Mr. Moya 
"was released from the Salt Lake County Jail . . . to the custody of 
New Mexico authorities" (R. 23). However, before Adult Probation & 
Parole (AP&P) became aware of the extradition, it filed an incident 
report, dated January 9, 1985, which recommended a "No Bail Bench 
Warrant" and an "Order to Show Cause hearing." (R. 20, 23). The 
report alleged that Mr. Moya had not contacted AP&P following his 
release from jail and implied that he had not paid his court-ordered 
restitution. (R. 20). Based upon these allegations the court 
authorized the Bench Warrant, dated Jaunuary 14, 1985, (R. 22), 
though no Order to Show Cause hearing was set nor did the State or 
AP&P file the affidavit required by statute (R. 20-21). 
On April 17, 1985, AP&P filed a second incident report 
which recommended that the interstate "NCIC,1 No bail warrant of 
January 14, 1985, be recalled, and that a [intrastate] 'Domestic7 
warrant, with [a] bail of $25,000 be issued" (R. 23). AP&P, now 
aware of Appellant's whereabouts, reported that since Mr. Moya's 
October 3, 1984 release, "[h]e has remained in [the custody of 
New Mexico authorities], and it appears now that the charges in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, will not be continued, due to prosecutorial 
problems" (R. 23). AP&P went on to state: "This agency [AP&P] does 
1
 Appellant believes that "NCIC," while not expressly 
defined by AP&P, stands for the "National Crime Information Center," 
a national system capable of notifying other states of outstanding 
bench warrants issued in Utah. In contrast, a "Domestic" warrant is 
only used intrastate. See infra Point IVB. 
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not feel that it would be advisable to extradite defendant back to 
Utah, but we would request that a 'Domestic' warrant be issued to 
arrest defendant in the event he decides to return to Utah" 
(R. 23). The court approved AP&P's recommendation and recalled the 
interstate bench warrant (R. 24, 28). In its place, the court 
issued the more local, "Domestic" bench warrant on May 1, 1985 
(R. 29). 
Following his release from custody, Appellant, while still 
in New Mexico, committed the offense of forgery on or about 
August 8, 1985 (R. 49). On September 23, 1986, Appellant entered a 
guilty plea on the forgery charge, but the New Mexico court 
suspended his sentence in favor of probation (R. 49-51). No further 
incidents took place and Appellant apparently returned to Utah some 
time in early to mid-1988 (TC. 15). 
On October 21, 1988, AP&P, cognizant of Mr. Moya's return 
to Utah, submitted for the first time an "Affidavit in Support of 
Order to Show Cause" which sought to revoke Appellant's probation 
(R. 41-42). The affidavit alleged, inter alia, that Appellant Moya 
had not reported to AP&P "for forty (40) months, those being April 
1985, through August 1988, . . . " that Appellant had not made any 
court-ordered payments, and that he had not "execute[d] a Probation 
Agreement." (R. 41-42, Jl, 2, 3). The court continued the Order to 
Show Cause hearing until October 25, 1988, giving AP&P time to check 
on Appellant's status in New Mexico (R. 40). 
On October 25, 1988, AP&P filed an "Amended Affidavit in 
Support of Order to Show Cause" after discovering that Appellant was 
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convicted in New Mexico. (R. 32, 33, f4). AP&P also alleged a 
July 2, 1988 Utah Burglary charge (R. 33, f5). The court continued 
the hearing again until November 10, 1988, this time giving 
Appellant's counsel time to review the newly received information 
(R. 43). 
At the November 10, 1988 Order to Show Cause hearing, the 
court, relying solely on hearsay statements and without reviewing 
the actual transcript of the September 13, 1984 sentencing 
proceeding, determined that Mr. Moya had violated his probation. 
(TB. 8);(R. 44). The court revoked Appellant's probation and 
reinstated his zero-to-five-year prison term. Appellant filed a 
Motion for Rehearing. (TB. 8);(R. 55). 
After various delays and the eventual production of the 
September 13, 1984 sentencing transcript, Appellant and the State 
again appeared before Judge Daniels' court on the Motion for 
Rehearing. (TC. 6). Judge Daniels reviewed the transcript, (R. 84); 
(TC. 19), compared it with the "Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) to 
Utah State Prison" form, (R. 17-18), and then ruled as follows: 
the conditions of [Mr. Moya's] probation were to be 
tolled until he came back to Utah and when he did, 
it seems to me [the Court] he violated his 
probation. And I don't think that you can just make 
yourself scarce for two or three or five years and 
then have your probation expire . . . I think 
the . . . law . . . would indicate that once a bench 
warrant is issued, the conditions of probation are 
stayed until such time as the defendant is 
arrested. So I think he was still on probation. 
(TC. 19-20). The court denied Appellant's Motion, relying 
improperly on the State's argument that a 1989 tolling provision 
applied to Appellant's 1984 sentencing proceeding. (TC. 17-20). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On September 13, 1984, a court sentenced Appellant Joseph 
Finano Moya to an indeterminate prison term of zero to five years 
which was immediately suspended and replaced by an eighteen-month 
period of probation. The court's jurisdiction over Mr. Moya's 
probation then terminated, by operation of law, eighteen months 
later on March 13, 1986. 
The State's failure to follow the statutory guidelines for 
a continuance, at even one time during Appellant's entire 
probationary period, also terminated the court's jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, when the State did act, it should not have recommended 
the recall of an interstate bench warrant issued against Appellant. 
The court, upon granting the State's request and in its place 
issuing a local "Domestic" warrant, indefinitely suspended 
Mr. Moya's sentence since he was then permitted to live freely in 
any jurisdiction outside of Utah for the rest of his life. 
The tolling provision, in effect at the time of Mr. Moya's 
sentencing, was nullified by the recent Utah Supreme Court decision 
of State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988). Mr. Moya's presence in 
New Mexico was also implicitly authorized by the State of Utah. 
The court committed reversible error when it improperly 
retained its jurisdiction over Mr. Moya's probation more than four 
years after the date of sentencing. Accordingly, the revocation of 
Mr. Moya's probation and the reinstatement of the prison term were 
also improper. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STATE V, GREEN'S INTERPRETATION OF THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE TERMINATED APPELLANT'S PROBATION AFTER 
EIGHTEEN MONTHS, 
"[T]he power to revoke probation must be exercised within 
legislatively established limits." State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 
464 (Utah 1988). The statutory authority here, as in Green, is Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984) which reads: 
Upon completion without violation of 18 months 
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 
six months in class B misdemeanor cases, the 
offender shall be terminated from sentence and the 
supervision of the Division of Corrections, unless 
the person is earlier terminated by the court. 
Id. Despite the fact that defendant Terry Green had indeed violated 
his probation in contravention of the first clause of the statute, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that defendant Green7s probation "shall 
be terminated" eighteen months after the date of his sentencing. 
Green, 757 P.2d at 464. In short, regardless of what the defendant 
may have done during his period of probation, after eighteen months 
the jurisdiction of the sentencing court ended. Id. 
In Green, defendant Green "pleaded guilty on February 7, 
1984, to a charge of issuing bad checks . . . ." Green, 757 P.2d 
462. On May 29, 1984, the trial court sentenced Green2 "to an 
indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison," 
2
 The Green Court applied Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) 
(Interim Supp. 1984) to defendant Green's May 29, 1984 sentence. 
The same statute would therefore apply to Appellant Moya's 
September 13, 1984 sentence. (R. 84). 
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fined him fifteen hundred dollars, and ordered him to pay 
restitution. Id. "The court suspended the prison term and the fine 
and placed defendant on probation. Defendant agreed as one 
condition of probation that he would not violate federal, state, or 
local rules." Id. 
Sometime during the months of April, May, and June of 1985, 
Green committed three statutory offenses for which he was ultimately 
convicted. Id. Shortly thereafter, on February 18, 1986, an Adult 
Probation & Parole (AP&P) officer informed the trial court of 
Green's involvement in the three offenses. Id. There is no 
indication that AP&P filed an affidavit in support of its initial 
report. However, after the court convicted Green on June 26, 1986, 
"AP&P [then] filed an affidavit of probation violation with the 
court on August 5, 1986." Green. 757 P.2d 462. Following various 
appeals and delays the trial court, on March 31, 1987, ordered Green 
"to serve the term of zero to five years originally imposed upon him 
for the bad check conviction." Id. at 463. Defendant Green 
appealed the trial court's revocation of his probation. 
The State in Green argued that the probation period is 
"tolled" whenever a defendant commits a violation within the 
eighteen-month period. The trial court agreed but the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed, holding: 
The statute requires that the offender "shall" be 
terminated from sentence if eighteen months' 
probation is completed without violation. This 
strong mandate is not consistent with the State's 
position that the eighteen month period is "tolled" 
when any violation occurs within the period and that 
there is no time limit for initiating a revocation 
action. 
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The Stated interpretation of the statute would 
create absurd results. Defendants would be left in 
a perpetual state of limbo; although their probation 
would appear to have been terminated, usually by 
entry of an order to that effect, defendants would 
actually be subject to a continued term of fictional 
supervision. This indefinite probationary term 
could theoretically be revoked many years after the 
original imposition and suspension of sentence. 
Decades could pass and then, based upon the 
discovery of a probation violation which had 
occurred during the statutory period, a court could 
revoke a term of probation thought to have been 
terminated long ago. This construction would 
obviate the certainty and regularity created by the 
statute and ignore the plain meaning of the word 
"terminate." 
Green, 757 P.2d at 464. 
The State's argument in the case at bar is virtually 
identical to the State's argument in Green. The exception is that 
the State here, unlike the State in Green, mistakenly relied3 on a 
1989 statute whose "tolling" provision was ineffective at the time 
of Appellant's sentencing. (TC. 17-18); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(8)(b) (Supp. 1989); see Addendum A. The 1989 statute 
tolls the probation period "upon the filing of a violation report 
with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of 
probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant 
by the court." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(b) (Supp. 1989). 
The court based its decision to revoke Appellant Moya's 
probation on this inapplicable provision, believing incorrectly that 
"the letter of the law itself would indicate that once a bench 
3
 The State misstated the nature and extent of the 
amendments made by the 1989 legislature. (TC. 18). A great deal 
more than the eighteen-month probation period was changed. See 
Addendum A. 
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warrant is issued, the conditions of probation are stayed until such 
time as the defendant [Mr. Moya] is arrested. So I [the court] 
think he was still on probation" (TC. 19-20) (emphasis added). 
Appellant Moya admits that if the 1989 provision was in effect when 
the court sentenced him on September 13, 1984, the State's tolling 
argument could apply. However, since the 1989 provision was not 
then in place, the State in Appellant Moya's case is left with the 
same untenable argument as the State in Green. If a probationer 
violates a condition of probation, his probation may not be revoked 
unless it is done pursuant to statute and within the eighteen-month 
automatic termination period. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim 
Supp. 1984); State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Dennev, 776 P.2d 91 (Utah App. 1989). 
A probation violation, by itself, is not enough to extend 
the court's jurisdiction unless the court first sets an Order to 
Show Cause hearing and then finds that the defendant had in fact 
violated his probation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 
1984); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-29 (1982).4 As noted by the Green 
4
 Since the State did not initiate revocation proceedings 
until after Appellant Moya's eighteen-month period of probation, it 
obviously did not adhere to all the constitutionally required 
procedures for probation revocation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-29 
(1982); cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (the minimum 
requirements of due process in revoking parole include (a) written 
notice of the claimed parole violations, (b) disclosure of the 
evidence against him, (c) an opportunity to be heard in person and 
to present witnesses and documentary evidence, (d) the right to 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, (e) a neutral hearing body, and 
(f) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied 
on and the reasons for revoking probation); Gaqnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U.S. 778 (1973) (recognizing that a probationer possesses liberty 
interests similar to those of a parolee and is entitled to the 
minimum due process requirements of Morrissey). 
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Court, "all but technical [probation] violations can be punished on 
their own merits, and the defendant's past record can be considered 
at that time." Green, 757 P.2d at 465. 
The State did not follow the statutory requirements and the 
court should not have followed the State's tolling argument. (TC. 
17-20). The court committed reversible error by reinstating 
Mr. Moya's prison sentence after Mr. Moya's probation had already 
been terminated, by operation of law, on March 13, 1986, eighteen 
months after his September 13, 1984 sentence. Green, 757 P.2d 462; 
Penney. 116 P.2d 91. 
POINT II 
THE STATE SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED APPELLANT'S 
PROBATION PURSUANT TO STATUTE. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the automatic termination clause 
does not apply, the relevant provisions of the 1984 statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984), would still preclude 
the court's revocation of Appellant's probation. The statutory 
provisions state: 
(12)(a) Probation may not be revoked except 
upon a hearing in court and a finding that the 
conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging 
with particularity facts asserted to constitute 
violation of the conditions of probation, the court 
which authorized probation shall determine whether 
the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe 
that revocation or modification of probation may be 
justified. If the court determines that there is 
probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the 
defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to 
show cause why his probation should not be revoked 
or modified. 
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(c) The order to show cause shall specify a 
time and place for the hearing, which shall be 
within seven days of the service upon the defendant 
unless he shows good cause for a continuance, and 
shall inform the defendant of the right to be 
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have 
counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. The 
order shall also inform the defendant of the right 
to present evidence as provided in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit 
or deny the allegations of the affidavit. If the 
defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, 
the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on 
the allegations, which need not be evidence 
admissible in a trial. The persons who have given 
adverse information on which the allegations are 
based shall be presented as witnesses subject to 
questioning by the defendant unless the court for 
good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may call 
witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and 
present evidence. 
(e) After hearing, the court shall make 
findings of fact. Upon determining that the 
defendant violated the conditions of probation, the 
court may order the probation revoked, modified, or 
continued. If probation is revoked, the defendant 
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed. 
Id.; see Addendum B. 
The trial court in Green, as in the case at bar, "could 
have continued its jurisdiction over [the] defendant for another 
eighteen-month term." Id. at 465. Defendant Green, like Appellant 
Moya, "had not yet completed paying all of the restitution that he 
was ordered to pay," a violation subjecting his probation to 
revocation, modification, or a continuance.5 Id.; (R. 20); Utah 
5
 Although the Green court correctly noted that the 1984 
statute does not specifically empower the trial court to continue 
its jurisdiction over defendant Green for another eighteen-month 
(continued) 
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Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8), (12)(e) (Interim Supp. 1984). 
The trial court below, much like the trial court in Green, 
was unable to revoke, modify, or continue Appellant Moya,s case 
because no Order to Show Cause hearing was set, nor did the State 
file an affidavit pursuant to statute (R. 20); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984). Instead AP&P, apparently 
unaware of Appellants extradition to New Mexico, filed an incident 
report, dated January 9, 1985,6 and requested a "No-Bail Bench 
Warrant." (R. 20). The court issued the NCIC warrant on 
January 14, 1985. (R. 21, 27); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-12-4 
(1982). 
AP&P's then filed a second incident report, dated April 17, 
1985, which stated in pertinent part: 
Defendant was released from the Salt Lake County 
Jail on October 3, 1984, to the custody of 
New Mexico authorities. He has remained in their 
custody, in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now 
that the charges in Albuquerque, New Mexico, will 
not be continued, due to prosecutorial problems. 
(footnote 5 continued) 
term, Green. 757 P.2d at 465 n.4, the 1984 statute did nevertheless 
empower the court to "order the probation . . . continued [for an 
unstated term]." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e) (Interim Supp. 
1984). 
6
 In its January 9, 1985 incident report AP&P recommended 
a NCIC "No Bail Bench Warrant" and an "Order to Show Cause Hearing" 
(R. 20). Although the court issued the bench warrant on January 14, 
1985, (R. 21-22), again an act inappropriate under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984), the court did not set the Order 
to Show Cause hearing until November 10, 1988, many years after 
Appellant's eighteen-month period of probation had expired (R. 40). 
AP&P should have followed through on its recommendation rather than 
being content with only the court-ordered bench warrant. 
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This agency (AP&P) does not feel that it would be 
advisable to extradite defendant back to Utah, but 
we would request that a domestic warrant be issued 
to arrest defendant in the event he decides to 
return to Utah. 
(R. 23); see Addendum C. Again, no Order to Show Cause hearing was 
set. See infra Point IVB (discussion on implicit authority by the 
State). 
AP&P did not adhere to the statutory requirements and 
wrongly filed two incident reports instead of an affidavit alleging 
"with particularity" various probation violations (e.g. nonpayment 
of restitution, failure to complete the alcohol treatment program). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984).7 If the State 
had properly initiated continuation proceedings, the court could 
have then determined whether AP&P's affidavit established "probable 
cause to believe that revocation or modification of probation may be 
justified." Id.8 After serving Appellant with a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause,9 he could have then explained 
why his probation should not be revoked or modified. Id. Following 
the hearing, "the court may [have ordered] the probation revoked, 
7
 AP&P has no excuse for not formally and properly filing 
an affidavit pursuant to statute. Even though AP&P filed two 
incident reports which did not conform to statute, it later 
displayed its ability to satisfy the requisite standards when it 
filed the "Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause." (R. 41); 
see Addendum D. 
8
 The trial court in Green, unlike the trial court in the 
instant action, issued "[a] certificate of probable cause" upon 
revoking defendant Green's probation. Green, 757 P.2d at 463. No 
such certificate was ever issued to Appellant Moya. 
9
 Appellant Moya also never received the affidavit nor the 
notice of the hearing until November 10, 1988. (R. 40, 41). 
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modified, or continued." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(e) (Interim 
Supp. 1984) (emphasis added). 
In contrast, the State's first action done pursuant to 
statute occurred October 21, 1988 when AP&P filed an "Affidavit in 
Support of Order to Show Cause" (R. 41-42); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(12)(b). An Order to Show Cause hearing was then 
scheduled, (R. 40), and eventually held to determine whether 
Mr. Moya violated his probation and whether the court should revoke 
his probation (TB. 1); (TC. 1). 
Since the court initially sentenced Mr. Moya on 
September 13, 1984 and the State failed to timely and properly 
continue Appellant's period of probation, the State's October 21, 
1988 affidavit was one year, seven months and eight days too late. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Interim Supp. 1984). Appellant 
Moya's probation had terminated, by operation of law, on March 13, 
1986. 
Everything done by AP&P or the court within the 
eighteen-month period of probation—AP&P's filing of the January 9, 
1985 incident report; the court-ordered January 14, 1985 NCIC bench 
warrant; AP&P's filing of the April 17, 1985 incident report; and 
the court-ordered May 1, 1985 "Domestic" bench warrant—were all 
wholly inadequate for a continuance under the express mandate of the 
1984 statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12) (Interim Supp. 1984). 
The court therefore erred in retaining its jurisdiction over 
Mr. Moya, in revoking his probation, and in reinstating the 
indeterminate prison term (TC. 19-20). The court's jurisdiction had 
not been continued. 
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POINT III 
THE COURT LOST ITS JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT AFTER 
HIS SENTENCE WAS INDEFINITELY SUSPENDED. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the automatic termination clause 
and the continuance arguments do not apply, the court's indefinite 
suspension of Appellant's sentence voided the validity of the 
subsequent revocation proceedings. The court lost its jurisdiction 
over Mr. Moya by indefinitely suspending his sentence. 
On April 17, 1985, seven months into Appellant's probation, 
AP&P reported that Mr. Moya "has remained in [the custody of 
New Mexico authorities] in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now 
that the charges in Albuquerque, New Mexico, will not be continued, 
due to prosecutorial problems" (R. 23). Despite Appellant Moya's 
impending release, AP&P did "not feel that it would be adviseable to 
extradite defendant [Mr. Moya] back to Utah, but we [AP&P] would 
request that a 'Domestic' warrant be issued to arrest defendant in 
the event he decides to return to Utah" (R. 23); see Addendum C. 
AP&P did absolutely nothing to extradite Appellant. See, 
infra. Point IV (discussion on implied authority by the State). 
Instead, AP&P recommended that the court recall the NCIC10 bench 
warrant in exchange for the local "Domestic" warrant (R. 23). When 
the court issued the May 1, 1985 Domestic warrant, it indefinitely 
suspended Appellant's sentence (R. 29). 
Once New Mexico released Appellant, Mr. Moya could live in 
1 0
 See supra note 1. 
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any jurisdiction other than Utah for the rest of his life. His 
freedom would only be compromised "in the event he decide[d] to 
return to Utah" (R. 23). Obviously, Mr. Moya may have never 
returned to Utah. Such indefinite sentences have been prohibited 
since the turn of the century: 
[The Utah Supreme Court knows] of no rule or 
principle of law whereby a court can indefinitely 
suspend sentence, keep the defendant in a state of 
suspense and uncertainty, and long after he has been 
discharged from custody, have him rearrested, and 
impose a sentence of either fine or imprisonment on 
him. 
In re Flint, 25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531 (1903) reprinted in Green, 757 
P.2d at 464. The Utah court left Appellant Moya in an impermissible 
state of uncertainty by condoning his freedom while still seeking 
his arrest only when, and if, many years after he had been 
discharged from custody "he decide[d] to return to Utah." (R. 23). 
Therefore, the trial court could not have properly revoked 
Appellant's probation because it no longer had jurisdiction over his 
case. £f. In re Flint. 71 P. at 532 ("When the court suspended 
judgment indefinitely, and ordered the defendant discharged from 
custody, it no longer had jurisdiction over him, and all subsequent 
proceedings . . . were unauthorized by law, and are therefore void"). 
POINT IV 
THE 1984 TOLLING PROVISION DOES NOT APPLY. 
Assuming further that the above arguments do not apply, the 
tolling provision of the 1984 statute would not apply to Appellant 
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Moya's situation. Appellants situation should also be governed by 
the decision of State v Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988). 
A. STATE V. GREEN RENDERS IMPRACTICABLE THE 1984 
TOLLING PROVISION. 
The principle underlying Green is that, in 1984, the acts 
or inactions of the probationer could not toll the eighteen-month 
period of probation. 757 P.2d 462; Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) 
(Interim Supp. 1984). Even though defendant Green had in fact 
violated the terms of his probation in April, May and June of 1985, 
eleven to thirteen months after his sentencing, the Green Court 
recognized that the eighteen-month probation period was not tolled 
because fl[t]he State's interpretation of the statute would create 
absurd results." Green, 757 P.2d at 464. Allowing the State "to 
revoke probation after the expiration of the eighteen-month period 
upon discovery that a [probation] violation occurred during that 
period . . . [would subject defendants] to a continued term of 
fictional supervision." Green, 757 P.2d at 463, 464. 
Green's interpretation of section (10)(a), the paragraph 
automatically terminating the court's jurisdiction and the 
accompanying period of probation after eighteen months, eviscerated 
the tolling provision in effect at the time of Appellant Moya's 
sentencing. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984). 
The 1984 tolling provision reads: 
(11)(b) Whenever any probationer, without authority 
from the Division of Corrections, absents himself 
from the state, or avoids or evades probation 
supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or 
evasion tolls the probation period. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984); see 
Addendum B. The tolling language of section (11)(b) should be 
construed in conjunction with the automatic termination clause of 
section (10)(a). See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 
P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984) ("Separate parts of an act should not be 
construed in isolation from the rest of the act"). 
Just as the court in Green refused to recognize the 
indefinite time limitations of section (10)(a), Appellant Moya now 
requests this Court to similarly preclude the application of the 
indefinite tolling provision of section (11)(b). Conceivably, both 
sections would allow the State to initiate a revocation proceeding 
decades after the actual occurrence of the probation violation. The 
Green Court found this result absurd. 757 P.2d at 464. 
The 1989 Utah Legislature also recognized this incongruity 
and amended the 1984 tolling provision in conformance with Green. 
The relevant 1989 provision now reads: 
(8)(b) The running of the probation period is 
tolled upon the filing of a violation report with 
the court alleging a violation of the terms and 
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an 
order to show cause or warrant by the court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(8)(b) (Supp. 1989); see Addendum A. The 
present tolling provision thus properly focuses on the actions of 
the State instead of on the actions or inactions of the 
probationer. However, since the 1989 provision was not in place at 
the time of Appellant Moya's 1984 sentencing, the only applicable 
tolling provision was section (11)(b), a soon-to-be-cured provision 
which left all probationers in a "perpetual state of limbo." Green, 
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757 P.2d at 464. Hence, section (11)(b) should also be controlled 
by section 10(a), the clause prohibiting indefinite time periods for 
initiating revocation proceedings. Under either section, the trial 
court's jurisdiction over Appellant Moya ended on March 13, 1986. 
B. THE STATE IMPLICITLY AUTHORIZED AND KNEW ABOUT 
APPELLANT'S WHEREABOUTS OUTSIDE THE STATE OF 
UTAH. 
Not only is section (11)(b) inapplicable when construed 
with the rest of the act, the section by itself appears inapposite 
to Mr. Moya's situation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim 
Supp. 1984) states in pertinent part, the probation period is tolled 
"[w]henever any probationer, without authority from the Division of 
Corrections, absents himself from the State, or avoids or evades 
probation supervision . . . ." Id. (emphasis added). 
On September 17, 1984, four days after the court had sentenced 
Appellant Moya, it ordered Appellant's extradition to New Mexico 
through an "Order of Release" (R. 19). On October 3, 1984, the Salt 
Lake County Jail released Mr. Moya into the custody of the 
New Mexico extradition authorities (R. 23). Appellant Moya's stay 
in New Mexico was therefore not an unlawful situation where he 
escaped confinement and fled to another jurisdiction. Rather, the 
State of Utah had expressly released Mr. Moya into New Mexico and 
then did nothing to secure his return. 
AP&P's April 17, 1985 incident report reflected its 
knowledge of Mr. Moya's whereabouts and his impending release from 
New Mexico. (R. 23). Nevertheless Utah did not ever, at that date 
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nor at any other time during Appellant's entire eighteen month 
period of probation, attempt to extradite Appellant back to Utah. 
Cf. Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-23 (Interim Supp. 1984) (procedures for 
extradition); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(3)(Interim Supp. 1984) ("the 
Division of Corrections is not required to supervise the probation 
. . . of any person convicted of a class B or C misdemeanor. . ." 
which, by negative implication, requires State supervision of any 
person, such as Appellant Moya, convicted of a felony). 
In Green, the Utah Supreme Court expressed little sympathy 
for the State's lack of knowledge and its inability to detect 
probation violations within the statutory time period. State v. 
Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988)(even though the State in Green did 
not know about defendant Green's probation violation until 
February 18, 1986, twenty-one months after his sentencing, that fact 
still would not justify tolling his probation). In marked 
difference the State in Appellant Moya's case knew that Mr. Moya had 
allegedly violated his probation as early as four and seven months 
after his sentencing. (R. 20, 23). Yet the State decided not to 
question him about his lack of compliance. 
The State of Utah actually furthered Appellant's freedom by 
downgrading the January 14, 1985 bench warrant in favor of the 
May 1, 1985 "Domestic" warrant. (TC. 14); (R. 23-30); cf- Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-12-4 (1982) (court's discretion in determining what type 
of warrant to issue); Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-22 (1982) ("Whenever 
the governor of this state shall demand a person charged 
with . . . breaking the terms of his . . . probation . . . in this 
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state . . .
 f he shall issue a warrant under the seal of this state 
to some agent [of the executive authority of any other state], 
commanding him to receive the person so charged . . . and convey him 
to . . . this state . . . . " ) ; see supra Point III. Consequently, 
foreign jurisdictions no longer knew about Appellant's situation in 
Utah. This fact is plainly evident by New Mexico's September 23, 
1986 "Judgment and Order Suspending Sentence." (R. 49-51). New 
Mexico made no mention of Appellant's criminal record in Utah. Had 
the NCIC warrant not been recalled, New Mexico authorities would not 
have released Appellant or, alternatively, would have placed him on 
probation in New Mexico only after informing the State of Utah. 
Utah thus decided to lose all track of Appellant until "he decide[d] 
to return to Utah" (R. 23). 
In short, because AP&P did "not feel that it would be 
adviseable to extradite defendant [Mr. Moya] back to Utah," the 
State implicitly authorized his presence in New Mexico. (R. 23). The 
tolling provision of the 1984 statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-18-1(11)(b) (Interim Supp. 1984), does not apply. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant Moya respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
the lower court's decision and remand this case for the entry of an 
order terminating Utah's custody over Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted this I [ day pf April, 1990. 
? a 
AMES A. VA t^tfEZ 
t t o r n e y f o r Defendant/Applel lant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Code • Co rr»*«. t u * UTAH LEGISLATIVE RFPORT 10*0 U D - i n 
H. B. No. 314 
Passed 2-22-89, Approved 3-14-89 
Effective 4-24-89 
Uws of Utah 1989, Chapter 226 
Probation Amendments 1989 
By R. Lee Ellertson 
An Act relating to criminal procedure; amen-
HB314 UTAH LEGISLATIVE REPORT 1989 Oxk#Co 
ding the length of probation and supervi-
sion. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
77-18-1, as last amended by Chapter 114, Laws 
of Utah 1987 
Be It toacted by the Legislature of the state of UUb: 
Section 1: Section Amended. 
Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as last amended by Chapter 114, Laws of Utah 
1987,' is amended to read: 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence - Probation -
Supervision - Presentence investigation • 
Standards - Confidential - Terms -
Termination - Restitution - Revocation 
Hearings. 
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conv-
ictioa pf. any crime or offense, the court may 
suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and 
place the defendant on probation. [Supervised] The 
coujttmay placcTihc defendant: 
(i) on probation [by) under the supervision of the 
(department may not be imposed by the court] 
Department of Corrections except in cases of class C 
misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local govern-
ment or with a private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court. [The jurisdiction of all prob 
ationers referred to the Department of Corrections 
is vested in the court having jurisdiction! custody is 
with the Department of Corrections,] 
(b) The legaf custody of all probationers [not 
referred to) under the supervision of the department 
is with the Department of Corrections. The legal 
custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the 
court [having jurisdiction of the defendant]. The 
court ha* continuing jurisdiction over all probatio-
ners. 
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall esta-
blish supervision and presentence investigation sta-
ndards for all individuals referred to the depart-
ment. These standards shall be based on the type of 
offense, the demand for services, the availability of 
agency resource*,, the public safety, and other crit-
eria established, by the Department of Corrections to 
determine what level of services shall.be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation stan-
dards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and 
Board of Pardons on an annual basis for review and 
comment pripf to. adoption, by the Department of 
Corrections.' 
(c) The Judicial Council and department shall 
establish procedures to implement the supervision 
and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall 
annually consider modifications to the standards 
based upon criteria in Subsection (2) (a) and other 
criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall 
annually prepare an impact report and submit it to 
the appropriate legislative appropriations committee. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the 
Department of Corrections is not' required to supe-
or C misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct 
presentence investigation reports on class C misde-
meanors or infractions.' However, the department 
may supervise the probation of class B misdemean-
ants in accordance with department standards. 
(4) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the 
court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for 
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obt-
aining a presentence investigation report from the 
Department of Correctidns or information from 
other sources about the defendant. The presentence 
investigation report shall include a specific statement 
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recomm-
endation from the Department of Corrections reg-
arding the payment of restitution by the defendant. 
The contents of the report are confidential and not 
available except for purposes of sentencing as pro-
vided by rule of the Judicial Council .and for use by 
the Department of Corrections. 
(b) Ar the time of sentence, the court shair hear 
any testimony or informatidn the defendant or the 
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning 
the appropriate sentence. This testimony or infor-
mation shall be presented in open court on record 
and in the presence of the defendant. 
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of 
probation,' the defendant may be required to 
perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed 
at the time of being placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, 
Title 77, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whqse 
support he is legally liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to 
exceed one year; 
(0 icrve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution 
programs; 
(h) pay, for the costs of investigation, probation, 
and treatment services; [and] 
(i) make restitution or reparation to ihe victim or 
victims in accordance with Subsections 76-3-201 
(3)and(4)fc];and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the 
court considers appropriate. 
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible, 
upon order of the court, for the collection of fines 
and restitution during the probation period in cases 
[where] for which the court orders supervised pro-
bation by the department. The prosecutor shall 
provide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of 
the court. The clerk shall place the order on the civil 
docket and shall provide notice of the order to the 
parties. The order is considered a legal judgment 
[under which the victim may seek civil remedy] 
enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
(7) (a) [Upon] Probation may be terminated at 
I any time at the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of [18 months'] 36 
months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor 
cases, or [sm\ \2 months in cases of class B [mis-
demeanor easest the probation period shall be ter-
minated» unless earlier terminated by the court] or C 
misdemeanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon 
expiration or termination of the probation period, 
has outstanding- fines or restitution owing, the court 
I mav retain Jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
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dant on bench probation for the limited purpose of 
enforcing the payment "of fines and restitution. 
Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon 
its own motion, the court may require the defendant 
to show cause why his failure to pay should not be 
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended 
jail or prison term should not be imposed. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify 
the sentencing court and prosecuting attorney in 
writing (45-deys) in advance in all cases [where] 
when termination of [supervision] supervised prob-
ation wilt occur by law. The notification shall 
include a probation progress report and complete 
repdrf of details on outstanding Pnes and restitution 
orders. 
1(c)-At tiny time prior to the termination of 
probatfoft-, 'Ufton a minimum of five days' notice 
and' a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and 
hearing- by 'the probationer, the court may extend 
probotion for an additional term of 18 months in 
felony or dais A misdemeanors or six months in 
class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both 
are owing.] 
(8) (a) f All time served without violation while on 
probation applies to service of the total term of 
probation but does not eliminate the requirement of 
serving 18 consecutive months without violation in 
cutive months without violation in class B misdem-
eanor cases.] Any time served by a probationer 
outside of confinement after having been charged 
with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to 
revoke probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probati-
oner is exonerated at a hearing to revoice the prob-
ation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a 
hearing or decision concerning revocation of prob-
ation docs not constitute service of time toward the 
total probation term unless the probationer is exo-
nerated at the hearing. 
(b) [When any probationer^ without authority 
from the court Or the Department of Corrections, 
absents himself from the statet or avoids or evades 
probation supervision, the period of absence, avoi 
dance* or evasion tolls the probation period.] The 
running of the probation period is tolled upon the 
filing of a violation report with the court alleging a 
violation of the terms and conditions of probation 
or upon the issuance of an OTder to show catise or 
warrant by the court. 
1(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court 
from discharging a probationer at any timet at the 
discretion of the Court,] 
(9) (a) [Except as provided in Subsection (7) (c) 
of this chapter4 probation} Probation may not be 
modified or extended except upon waiver of a 
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a 
finding in court that the probationer has violated 
the conditions of probation. Probation may not be 
revoked except upon a hearing in court and a 
finding that the conditions of probation have been 
violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with 
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of 
the conditions of probation, the court [which] that 
authorized probation shall determine [whether] if 
the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe 
that revocation, modification, or extension of pro-
bation is justified. IT the court determines [that]
 { 
there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served 
on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy 
of the affidavit and an order to show cause'why his 
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probation should not be revoked, modified, or ext-
ended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time 
1 and place for the hearing, and shall be served upon 
the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing. 
The defendant shall show good cause for a contin-
uance. The order to show cause shall inform the 
defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at 
the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him 
if he is indigent. The order shall also inform the 
defendant of a right to present evidence. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or 
deny the allegations of the affidavit.4 If the defen-
dant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the 
allegations. The persons who have given adverse 
information on which the allegations are based shall 
be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by 
the defendant unless the court for good cause oth-
erwise orders. The defendant may call witnesses, 
appear and speak in his own behalf, and present 
evidence. 
(e) After the hearing!,] the court shall make fin-
dings of fact. Upon a finding that the defendant 
violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, continued, 
or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sen-
tenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be 
executed. 
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is 
considered a debt for "willful and malicious injury" 
for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in 
bankruptcy as provided in Title II, Section 523, 
U.S.CA. 1985. 
H. B. No. 322 
Passed 2-22-89, Approved 3-13-89 
Ef fective 4-24-89 
Laws of Utah 1989, Chapter 153 
Juror and Witness Fees 1989 
By R. Lee Ellertson, Stephen M. Bodily, Franklin 
C. Prante 
An Act relating to judicial procedure; amen-
ding provisions regarding juror and witness 
fee procedures; and amending the fee 
amounts. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
AMENDS: 
17-18-1, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws of 
Utah 1979 
17-20-1, as last amended by Chapter 152, Laws 
of Utah 1988 
17-20-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
21-5-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
21-5-4, as last amended by Chapter 152, Laws of 
Utah 1988 
21-5-5. Utah Code Annotated 1953 
21-5-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953 
21-5-7.5, as enacted by Chapter 152, Laws of 
ADDENDUM B 
CH. 20 CRIMINAL LAW 
CHAPTER 20 
S. B. No. 91 (Passed January 28, 19S4. In effect March 29, 1984.) 
MISDEMEANORS- -PROBATION REDUCTIONS 
By Senators Stratford, Cornaby 
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; OMITTING PROBA-
TION FOR CLASS C MISDEMEANORS; SPECIFYING PROBATION 
PROCEDURES IN GENERAL; AND PLACING RESTITUTION OB-
LIGATIONS OUTSTANDING AT THE END OF PROBATION UNDER 
THE COURTS' CIVIL JURISDICTION FOR COLLECTION. 
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 77-18-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 85, LAWS OF UTAH 1983. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah: 
Section 1. Section amended. 
Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by 
Chapter 85, Laws of Utah 1983, is amended to read: 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence--Probation--Period-- Supervision-
-Presentence investigation--Conditions--Restitution-- Revocation. 
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or 
offense, except in the case of class C misdemeanors, for which probation 
may not be imposed, and if it appears compatible with the public interest, 
the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place 
the defendant on probation for [sueh] a period of time [as] it 
[determines] may determine, unless otherwise provided by law. The legal 
custody of all probationers is vested in the court having jurisdiction of the 
offender and the chief agent of the adult probation and parole section of 
the [state division of corrections] Division of Corrections. [In cases that 
do not involve an indeterminate sentence, the period of probation may 
exceed the length of time of the maximum sentence that could be im-
posed.] 
(2) (a) The Division of Corrections shall establish presentence inves-
tigation and supervision standards for all individuals under its jurisdiction. 
These standards shall be based on the type of offense and other criteria. 
mr 
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»,n£ thedemand for services and the available agency resources, which 
^ ^^oTCoTTCCiions d e e m s appropriate to determine what level of 
^ \:cc^^2jIL^g provided, 
(p ) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted 
_ c <iateJudicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment 
^ ^ :rTadogtion by the Division of Corrections^ 
(7) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Division of Correc-
„s* 1S not required to supervise the probation or parole of any person 
-Girted of a class B or C misdemeanor but may, at the discretion of the 
j* .t ^Tnnof^  Corrections, and based upon adopted standards, accept a person 
,
 t, tnperyision who is convicted of a class B misdemeanor. 
[ (3) ] (4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for an offense for which 
—obation may be granted, the court may, with the concurrence of the 
c/cndant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reason-
a -x period of time for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence report on 
:r.c defendant. The report shall be prepared by the [department of adult 
f-obattofl and parole] Department of Adult Probation and Parole. The 
report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied 
H, a recommendation from adult probation and parole regarding the 
pigment of restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report shall be 
confidential. The court may disclose all or parts of the report to the 
ccfendant or his counsel as the interest of justice requires. At the time of 
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant 
or the prosecuting attorney may wish to present concerning the appropriate 
sentence. [Such] This testimony or information shall be presented in open 
court on record and in the presence of the defendant. 
[B)] (5) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a verdict against 
the defendant on a plea of a former conviction or acquittal or once in 
jeopardy, if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court 
must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment in accordance with Rule 22, 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Whenever possible, in all offenses 
involving damage to persons or property, the pre-sentence report of the 
defendant shall be made available to the court prior to the pronouncement 
of judgment. 
[(4)] (6) After a hearing, the court may increase or decrease the 
probation period, unless otherwise provided by law, and may revoke or 
modify any condition of probation. While on probation, and as a condition 
inereof, the defendant may be required to: 
(a) [ Pay ] pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of 
being placed on probation; 
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(b) [Pay] pav amounts required under provisions of Section 77-32a-l 
through 77-32a-14; 
(c) [Provide] provide for the support of others for whose support he 
is legally liable; 
(d) [ Participate ] participate in available rehabilitation programs; 
(e) [Serve] serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one 
year; or 
(f) [Serve] serve a term of home confinement. The court may impose 
all or part of the costs of supervision as a condition of home confinement. 
(7) Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a hearing in court a 
finding is made that restitution is inappropriate under Subsection 76-3-201 
(3) (b) or the defendant objects to its imposition under Subsection 76-3-201 
(3) (c). 
[(5)] (8) While on probation and as a condition thereof, the defendant 
shall be required to make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims 
as defined in Subsection 76-3-201 (4) for pecuniary damages as provided in 
Section 76-3-201 caused by the offense to which the defendant has pleaded 
guilty, no contest, or for which a conviction was had or by any other 
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court, unless 
the court in applying the criteria stated in Subsection 76-3-201 (3) finds 
that restitution is inappropriate. If the court determines that restitution is 
inappropriate, the court shall state for the court record the reasons for the 
decision. 
[(6)] (9) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to 
the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket 
and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The order shall be 
treated as a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil remedy. 
(10) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor 
cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence and the supervision 
of the Division of Corrections, unless the person is earlier terminated by 
the court. 
(b) The Division of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court in 
writing of all cases where termination of supervision occurs by law. The 
notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report 
of details on outstanding fines and restitution orders. 
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(11)(a) AH time served on probation by any person without violation 
applies^0 service of the total term of probation but does not preclude the 
r^qmren^nt of serving 18 months without violation in felony or class A 
^demeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor cases. Any time 
spp^T^^ person outside of confinement after commission of a probation 
N Ration does not constitute service of the total term unless the person is 
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. Any "time spent in 
refinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of proba-
u o n does not constitute service of the term of probation except in the case 
0f exoneration at the hearing, in which case the time spent shall be included 
m computing the total probation term. 
(b) Whenever any probationer, without authority from the Division of 
perfections, absents himself from the state, or avoids or evades probation 
^^ryjsion, the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion tolls the probation 
period. 
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court from discharging a 
probationer at any time, at the discretion of the court. 
[£?)] (12) (a) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in 
court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court 
which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes 
probable cause to believe that revocation or modification of probation may 
be justified. If the court determines that there is probable cause, it shall 
cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to 
show cause why his probation should not be revoked or modified. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing, which shall be within seven days of the service upon the defendant 
unless he shows good cause for a continuance, and shall inform the 
defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to 
have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent. The order shall also 
inform the defendant of a right to present evidence as provided in the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations 
of the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations, which need 
not be evidence admissible in a trial. The persons who have given adverse 
information on which the allegations are based shall be presented as 
witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good 
cause otherwise orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak 
in his own behalf, and present evidence. 
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(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings of fact. Upon 
determining that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the 
court may order the probation revoked, modified, or continued. If proba-
tion is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously 
imposed shall be executed. 
[($) Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a hearing in court a 
finding is made that restitution is inappropriate pursuant to Subsection 
76 3 201 (3) (b) or the defendant objects to its imposition pursuant to 
Subsection 76 3 201 (3) (c).] 
(13) In cases where an 18-month probation term in felony and class A 
misdemeanor cases or a six-month term in class B misdemeanor cases has 
been completed without violation, but fine or restitution orders are still 
outstanding, supervision by the Division of Corrections shall be terminated 
pursuant to this section. The court may retain civil jurisdiction for the 
purposes of collecting the fines or restitution. In these cases, the court may 
order the Department of Social Services to enforce the collection, and the 
Office of Recovery Services may withhold the cost of collection from any 
recovered fine or restitution. 
[&)] (14) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt 
for "willful and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to 
discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 
Approved February 16, 1984. 
ADDENDUM C 
INCIDENT REPORT 
DATE April 17, 1985 
NAME: MOYA, Joseph Finano, aka PADILLA COURT CASE NO.: CR 84-892 
COURT: Third Judicial District JUDGE: Scott Daniels 
DATE RECEIVED ON PROBATION: September 13, 1984 OFFENSE: Burglary, Fel III0 
ADDRESS: Rio Arriba Co Jail, Espanola, N M EMPLOYMENT: — — 
COMMENTS: 
Reference our incident report of January 9, 1985, and the Pre-Sentence 
Report of September 7, 1984. 
Defendant was released from the Salt Lake County Jail on October 3, 
1984, to the custody of New Mexico authorities. He has remained in their 
custody, in Rio Arriba County, and it appears now that the charges in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, will not be continued, due to prosecutorial problems. 
This agency does not feel that it would be adviseable to extradite 
defendant back to Utah, but we would request that a "Domestic" warrant be . r\ 
issued to arrest defendant in the event he decides to return to,Utah.. if\ J) 
APPROVED f£c^Mt lemur' 
DENIED 
DATE 
COMMENT 
IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN BY AGENT: Obtained data, informed Supervisor and Court. 
RECOMMENDATION: Request that N C I C, No Bail warrant of January 14, 1985, be 
recalled, and that a "Domestic" warrant, with bail of $25,000.00 be issued. 
EUGENE F. P R E S S E T T S U P E R V I S O R /JOHN W. MCNEILL DISTRICT AGENT 
NOTEr-This form is used to report rule infractions to the Court. 
Original stays in file 
Signed copy to Court 
Other copies"as needed 
APSP/26 11/80 
ADDENDUM D ( l ) 
OCT 3 1 1988 
H. Dixon Hindtey. CJferk 3rd JDist. Court 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
VS : ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
MOYA, Joseph Finano : Court Case No: CR 84-892 
Defendant : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) • ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
JOHN W. MC NEILL, being duly sworn upon an oath 
deposes and says that: He is a Probation Officer for the Utah State 
Department of Corrections; that on the 10th day of August, 1984, the 
above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Burglary, a 
Third Degree Felony in the above-entitled Court and on the 13th day of 
September, 1984, was sentenced to serve a term of not to exceed 5 years in 
the Utah State Prison; that the execution of the imposed sentence was 
stayed and the defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of 
the Department of Corrections; that the above-entitled defendant did 
violate the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation as follows, 
to-wit: 
1. That the defendant has failed to report to The Department of 
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, for forty (40) months, those 
being April 1985, through August 1988, inclusive in violation of the 
Courts orders per Judgement dated on the 13th of September 1984. 
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2. That the defendant has failed to make any payments ordered by the Court 
per Judgement of 13th of September, 1984. 
5. That the defendant failed to report to the Department of Corrections, 
Adult Probation and Parole, to execute a Probation Agreement in 
violation of the Court's order per Judgement order of the 13th of 
September, 1984. 
i. That the defendant committed the offense of Theft by receiving of about 
6:00 a.m. on or about the 26th of September 1988, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, in that the defendant did, as a party to the offense, 
receive, retain, conceal , or withhold the property of Advanced Weather 
Proofing, to-wit: one typewriter, and blank checks, knowing they were 
stolen, and/or believing they probably had been stolen, with the purpose 
to deprive the owner thereof, in violation of the Courtfs order of 
probation executed by the Court per Judgement Order of the 13th of 
September, 1984. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order of the Court issue 
lirecting and requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before 
;aid Court to show cause, if any, he has, why the aforesaid period of 
>robation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not be 
"orthwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
JOHN W. MC NEILL, PROBATION OFFICER 
iubscribed and sworn to before me this 3^dl day of &C$&1--VJL^S > 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah 
Commission expires: :s.—C/~fh 
ADDENDUM D ( 2 ) 
O C T 2 5 1 9 8 8 
3rd DJSt. Court H. Dix0h Hindley, C>ark r 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
VS 
MOYA, Joseph F i n a n o 
Defendant 
^AMENDED 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Court Case No: CR84-892 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
): ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
JOHN W. MC NEILL, being duly sworn upon an oath 
deposes and says that: He is a Probation Officer for the Utah State 
Department of Corrections; that on the 10th day of August, 1984, the 
above-named defendant was adjudged guilty of the crime of Burglary, a 
Third Degree Felony in the above-entitled Court and on the 13th day of 
September, 1984, was sentenced to serve a term of not to exceed 5 years in 
the Utah State Prison; that the execution of the imposed sentence was 
stayed and the defendant was placed on probation under the supervision of 
the Department of Corrections; that the above-entitled defendant did 
violate the terms and conditions of the defendant's probation as follows, 
to-wi t: 
1. That the defendant has failed to report to The Department of 
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, for forty (40) months, those 
being April 1985, through August 1988, inclusive in violation of the 
Courts orders per Judgement dated on the 13th of September 1984. 
OGUGJ£ 
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l. That the defendant has failed to make any payments ordered by the Court 
per Judgement of 13th of September, 1984. 
5. That the defendant failed to report to the Department of Corrections, 
Adult Probation and Parole, to execute a Probation Agreement in 
violation of the Court's order per Judgement order of the 13th of 
September, 1984, 
4. That the defendant committed the offense of Forgery, a Third Degree 
Felony, on or about the 8th of August 1985, in Espanola, New Mexico, in 
that the defendant did, as a party to the offense, attempt to cash a 
check which he knew, or should have known, was stolen, to which offense 
the defendant entered a plea of guilty on the 5th day of November, 1985, 
said offense being in violation of the Court's order of probation 
executed by the Court per Judgement Order of the 13th of September, 1984. 
5. That the defendant committed the offense of Burglary, a Third Degree 
Felony, on or about the 2nd day of July, 1988, at about 76 South 900 
West, Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, Utah, in that the defendant 
did enter or remain in the premises of the 76 Club, at the aforesaid 
address, with the intent to commit a Theft, said offense being in 
violation of the Court's order of probation executed by the Court per 
Judgement Order of 13th day of September 1984. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Order of the Court issue 
directing and requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear 
said Court to show cause, if any, he has, why the aforesaid period 
probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant should not 
forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
^ J O H N W. MC NEILL, PROBATION OFFICER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of October, 1988. 
NOTARY PUBLIC \ 
Residing: Salt Lake City, Utah 
Commission expires: 02-04-90 
before 
of 
be 
